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A New Perspective: Investment and Efficiency under Incentive
Regulation
Rahmatallah Poudineh* and Tooraj Jamasb**
ABSTRACT
Following the liberalisation of the electricity industry since the early 1990s, many
sector regulators have adopted incentive regulation aided by benchmarking and
productivity analysis. This approach has often resulted in efficiency and quality
of service improvement. However, there remains a growing concern as to whether
the utilities invest sufficiently and efficiently in maintaining and modernising their
networks. This paper studies the relationship between investments and cost effi-
ciency in the context of incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of
investments using a panel dataset of 129 Norwegian distribution companies from
2004 to 2010. We introduce the concept of “no impact efficiency” as a revenue-
neutral efficiency effect of investment under incentive regulation that makes a
firm “investment efficient” in cost benchmarking. Also, we estimate the observed
efficiency effect of investments and compare these with the no impact efficiency.
Finally, we discuss the implications of cost benchmarking for investment behav-
iour of network companies.
Keywords: Investments, Cost efficiency, Incentive regulation, Distribution
network, No impact efficiency
http://dx.doi.org/10.5547/01956574.36.4.rpou
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, achieving a sustainable electricity sector, security of supply, and reliability
of service have emerged as overarching energy policy objectives in many countries. A sustainable
energy economy is highly dependent on decarbonising the electricity sector. Meanwhile, further
electrification of the energy is generally regarded as desirable for a sustainable energy-economy.
These objectives are pursued through large scale deployment of renewable energy resources, more
efficient use of energy, and active participation of the demand side.
Achieving the above goals requires a transformation of the electricity networks through
expansion of grids, adoption of new technologies for managing the variability of the supply side,
accommodating an active demand side, and focused research and development. Such transformation
can only be reached through substantial capital investments. Given the anticipated scale of the
required investments in the coming years, ensuring sufficient and efficient investments in the net-
works presents itself as a policy and regulatory priority.
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Following the liberalisation of the electricity industry since the early 1990s, many sector
regulators have recognised the potential for cost efficiency improvement in the networks through
incentive regulation aided by cost benchmarking and productivity analysis. Although benchmarking
has achieved efficiency improvements (mainly in operating costs), new challenges have emerged
as how to address the issue of network investments. The challenge is whether a regulatory scheme
can be designed to provide the right incentives for the delivery of cost effective services while
ensuring there is no systematic underinvestment or overinvestment. Hence, regulators need to bal-
ance the cost and risk of underinvestment against the cost of overinvestment in maintaining and
modernising the networks.
Incentive regulation accentuates static cost efficiency while investment is a dynamic and
long term activity. On the other hand, benchmarking is a relative concept in the sense that a firm’s
efficiency depends not only on its own performance but also on the performance of other companies.
The paradoxical effect of incentive regulation concerning investment and the peculiar specifications
of total cost benchmarking complicate the relationship between investment and cost efficiency under
incentive regulation with the ex-post regulatory treatment of investments.
This paper analyses the relationship between cost efficiency and investments under incen-
tive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of capital expenditure using the case of electricity
distribution networks in Norway. The contribution of this paper is two-folded. Firstly, we introduce
the concept of “no impact efficiency” as a revenue-neutral efficiency effect of investment under
incentive regulation which makes the firm “investment efficient” and immune from cost disallow-
ance in benchmarking process. Secondly, we estimate the “observed” efficiency effect of investment
in order to compare this with no impact efficiency and discuss the implication of cost benchmarking
for network investments in Norway. Despite the important role of regulatory treatment of capital
expenditure, using benchmarking total costs, for investments behaviour and efficiency improvement
in the networks, the topic has not been formally studied in the empirical literature.
The next section discusses the relationship between network investments and incentive
regulation with reference to the Norwegian regulatory regime. Section 3 describes the methodology
used to conceptualise the efficiency implications of investment under incentive regulation and also
presents the stochastic frontier analysis procedure. The empirical results are presented and discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 is the conclusions.
2. INVESTMENT AND REGULATION
Electricity network companies are regulated natural monopolies and hence, investments
by these firms are not governed by market mechanisms where decisions are normally based upon
expected higher returns than the cost of capital. In a regulated environment such as the electricity
networks, the investment behaviour of firms is strongly influenced by their regulatory framework
and institutional constraints (Vogelsang, 2002; Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996). The low-powered
regulatory regimes such as pure “rate of return regulation” are often associated with poor incentive
for efficiency. Averch-Johnson (1962) showed that regulated monopolies have an incentive to over-
invest when the allowed rate of return is higher than the cost of capital.
Incentive-based regimes such as price or revenue caps aim to overcome the efficiency
problem by decoupling prices from utilities’ own costs. However, they also give rise to new chal-
lenges regarding the level of investments. The issue of cost efficiency at the expense of investments
or service quality has been discussed in the literature (see e.g., Giannakis et al., 2005; Rovizzi and
Thompson, 1995; Markou and Waddams Price, 1999). In addition, when rewards and penalties are
weak or uncertain, the incentives for cost reductions outweigh the inducement to maintain quality
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of service and investment (Burn, and Riechmann, 2004). Furthermore, implementing incentive
regulation is complicated and an evaluation of the associated efficiency is more difficult than it is
often implied (Joskow, 2008).
The empirical evidence concerning investment behaviour of firms under incentive regime
is not conclusive. While some initially argued that incentive regulation will lead to underinvestment,
subsequent empirical works demonstrated that the outcome of the incentive regulation concerning
the investment behaviour can be in either direction. Waddams Price et al. (2002), state that a high-
powered incentive regulation might lead to overinvestment. Roques and Savva (2009) argue that a
relatively high price cap can encourage investment in cost reduction as in an unregulated company.
Nagel and Rammerstorfer (2008), on the other hand, show that a strict incentive regulation regime
is more likely to create disincentive for investment. However, it is generally agreed that in incentive
regulation regimes, due to the separation of firms’ own cost from prices, the motivation for cost
reducing investment is higher than under the rate of return regulation models (Ai and Sappington,
2002; Greenstein et al., 1995; Cambini and Rondi, 2010).
Thus, the main challenge of the regulator is to design the right incentives in order to
prevent any systematic overcapitalisation or underinvestment. The ability to disallow excessive
costs can help regulators achieve more efficient levels of investments which otherwise firms would
tend to overinvest in risky projects (Lyon and Mayo, 2005). However, following periods of cost
disallowances there is a greater possibility of disincentive for investments.
The regulatory opportunistic behaviour is also a concern for the regulated firms as this
introduces uncertainty into the regulatory contract. Gal-Or and Spiro (1992), for example, argue
that a sudden shift in the regulatory regime which allows for the use of cost disallowance instruments
will decrease the propensity to invest. Thus, the presence of uncertainty in regulation influences
investment behaviour of network companies. Under uncertainty, delaying investments may be ben-
eficial even though a project may recover its capital costs (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). There is also
non-regulatory uncertainty, such as future demand, that the regulated company needs to take into
consideration when deciding to invest.
From the regulatory viewpoint, it is important that decisions influencing the investment
level of the firms are based upon economic efficiency. For example, the cost of reducing service
interruptions through investments should be lower than the socio-economic costs of service inter-
ruption. In effect, the regulator seeks an efficient level of investment in the grid although realising
this goal through regulation is a challenging task. On the one hand, theory does not provide clear
indications of the conditions under which “efficient” levels of investment are achieved and which
factors lead to over or underinvestment (von Hirschhausen, 2008). On the other hand, the empirical
evidence from cases of overinvestment or underinvestment is rare. Therefore, the outcome of in-
centive regulation regarding investments is ambiguous, and that regulators, in practice, tend to
adopt a combination of different incentive mechanisms in order to achieve their objectives.
2.1 Power Sector Reform and Network Regulation in Norway
Norway was among the first countries, after Chile and the UK, which embarked on power
sector reform by unbundling the different elements of the electricity industry across the value chain.
The generation and retail supply which are potentially competitive were separated from the trans-
mission and distribution that are natural monopolies. Therefore, the distribution and transmission
networks are subject to economic regulation. The Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Direc-
torate (NVE) were appointed as the sector regulator since Norwegian Energy Act came into effect
in 1991. Unlike the other countries where the regulatory reform was often accompanied by transfer
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1. In 2010, about 67 companies were involved in generation, grid operation, and supply to end users. Vertically integrated
companies with more than 100,000 customers are obliged to separate their monopolistic operation from competitive activities
(legal unbundling) (NVE, 2010). Also, the Energy Act requires the integrated companies to keep separate accounts for their
monopoly and competitive businesses (NVE, 2010).
2. A network that falls below this minimum level will receive a correction in its revenue to achieve a minimum 2%
return on capital. The normal rate of return for Norwegian distribution networks is currently 5.62%.
of ownership, the Norwegian power industry mainly remained under the state or local municipal-
ities’ control after the reform. Also, companies that are involved in both monopolistic (distribution
or regional transmission) and competitive businesses (generation or retail supply) are required to
keep them separated legally and/or financially.1
In the early years of the reform, there were approximately 230 distribution networks and
70 generation units in Norway. The high number of utilities reflects the dispersed nature of the
hydroelectric resources as the main source of power generation as well as the historical development
of the sector in the country. In December 2010, around 167 companies were engaged in grid
operation (NVE, 2010). The marked reduction in the number of distribution companies is the result
of mergers and acquisitions among the network companies in pursuit of scale efficiency and other
gains.
After the reform, initially, the distribution companies were operating under a rate of return
regulatory regime. However, due to the lack of incentives for cost efficiency, since 1997, the reg-
ulatory regime was changed to incentive regulation. From 2007, NVE has implemented a new
regulatory model which uses the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as efficiency and cost bench-
marking method. The networks companies are regulated with a revenue cap regime that covers their
costs annually based on their distance from the efficient frontier (best practice) in the sector.
2.2 Investments under Norwegian Regulatory Regime
A feature of the Norwegian incentive regulation is to prevent systematic overinvestment
or underinvestment in the networks. The incentives are provided through a combination of economic
and direct regulation (NordREG, 2011). Along with profit motivation, the network companies need
to undertake substantial investments in order to meet their obligations as stated in the Energy Act.
For example, Section 3-4 of the amended Energy Act states that distribution companies are obliged
to connect new generation sources and consumers that are not covered by the supply requirement.
Moreover, distribution companies are incentivised to maintain a high level of quality of
service. The cost of network energy losses and cost of energy not supplied (CENS) due to inter-
ruptions or capacity constraints in the grid are incorporated in the regulatory model so that the firms
take them into account. Therefore, firms normally should not have incentive to tune out their
reinvestments as this would increase their total costs due to deterioration of their quality of service
over time. In addition, a profit incentive is provided through a minimum guaranteed return on
capital. The regulation states that all companies should achieve a reasonable (minimum 2%) return
on capital, given effective management, utilization, and development of the networks2. Similarly,
overinvestment will increase the total costs and will negatively affect their relative efficiency in the
cost benchmarking exercise which will impact their revenue adversely.
Figure 1 shows total investments, new investments, and reinvestments by the distribution
companies between 2004 and 2010. As shown in the figure, total investments are strictly increasing
since 2006. The investment data indicates that the source of the increase is the reinvestments and
not the new investments. Although new investments remained almost constant, they have had a
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Figure 1: Investments in Norwegian Distribution Companies
higher share in total investments than reinvestments. For instance, 68% of the investments obser-
vations, during the period of study, have a share of new investments to total investments higher
than 50%. This can be an indication of strong investment incentives which have motivated the
networks to undertake new investments, possibly beyond their minimum reinvestment needs. Such
a change can be attributed to the view that social costs of underinvestment are higher than social
benefits of overinvestment (Helm and Thompson, 1991).
3. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first present a model of the incentive regulation of electricity distribution
networks in Norway and then analyse the relationship between investments by the utilities and the
change in their relative efficiency under incentive scheme. We then describe the econometric ap-
proach and the models estimated in order to explore the efficiency effects of investments.
3.1 Modelling Incentive Regulation
The allowed revenues of regulated networks are determined by incentive regulation and
cost efficiency benchmarking. Within this framework, investments are encumbered indirectly such
that overinvestment can result in partial disallowance of investment costs. The Norwegian regulator
computes the allowed revenue ( ) of the networks using Equation (1), which, in essence, is aREt
generic incentive regulation formula representing the trade-off between cost reduction incentive
and rent transfer to the consumers, given the presence of asymmetric information between the firm
and the regulator (Newbery, 2002; Joskow, 2005).
∗RE = C + k(C – C ) (1)t t t t
Where is the actual (own) costs of a network company, is the norm cost obtained by using∗C Ct t
the frontier-based benchmarking method Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and is the powerk
246 / The Energy Journal
3. In order to incentivise network companies to improve service quality (NVE, 2011).
4. While the current and previous year investments (years t and t–1) are not included in the regulatory asset base (RAB)
due to a time-lag, the companies can start to calculate a return on investment into their allowed revenue (i.e. tariff base)
from the commissioning year.
of incentive in terms of the weight given to benchmarked costs vs. actual costs in setting the allowed
revenue. The power of incentive is important for motivating the firms to move as close as possible
to their norm (benchmarked) cost as they lose revenue when deviating from the efficient frontier.
The share of actual costs and norm costs in determining the revenue caps is currently 40% and 60%
respectively (i.e. ) (NVE, 2008). Placing more weight on norm costs increases the incentivek = 0.6
power of regulation and promotes indirect competition among the utilities to improve their cost
efficiency relative to best practice.
Actual costs include operating and maintenance costs, capital costs, depreciation costs and
cost of negative externalities such as network energy loss and service interruptions. In addition, the
regulator deducts the cost of energy not supplied (CENS) from the firms’ revenue cap3 and adjusts
the allowed revenue for tax and other non-controllable expenses. The regulator uses data with a
two year lag which is updated with an inflation index. The allowed revenue is then adjusted at the
end of the year when final actual data becomes available.4
We divide both sides of (1) with and rearrange such that it yields:Ct
RE = C [1 + k(e –1)] (2)t t t
where is the firms’ efficiency in period . When a firm invests the amount , this will
∗Ct
e = t Int Ct
impact its revenue by changing its relative efficiency in cost benchmarking. The variables for before
and after undertaking investments are denoted by subscripts 1 and 2 respectively. The change in a
firm’s revenue due to an investment can be computed from equation (3).
DRE = RE – RE = C – C + k[C (e –1)– C (e –1)] (3)2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1
The change in actual cost of the firms after undertaking investments is equal to the amount of
investments ( ). We substitute for in the bracket and rearrange (3) as presentedDC = C – C = In C2 1 2
in (4) to show the change in revenue as a result of investments.
DRE = DC + k[C (e – e ) + In (e –1)]1 2 1 214444244443 (4)
Revenue effect of investments due to benchmarking
Equation (4) presents the main framework for the network companies’ incentive to undertake in-
vestments. In the absence of cost benchmarking (i.e., when ) the firm would automaticallyk = 0
earn a return on its investments because the change in the firm’s revenue is the same as the change
in its cost ( ), and the company can pass all its investment costs to its customers. However,DRE = DC
as investments are included in cost benchmarking, the firms’ revenue also depends on their relative
cost efficiency before investments ( ) and after investments ( ). This is reflected in the seconde e1 2
component of (4), to which we refer as in (5), and shows the (gross) revenue effect of investmentsQ
due to benchmarking.
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5. i.e. (e2 –e10, e2 –e10 or e2 –e1 = 0).
6. The reason is that if the share of investments to other costs (before investments) increases, the efficiency required to
satisfy the inequality rises considerably. However, under certain circumstance we can have which we refer to it inQ0
Section 4.
7. For simplicity, we assume that the frontier firms are genuinely efficient. In practice, this may not be the case.
8. The ratio of ‘investment to other costs before investments’, the average of this ratio for the Norwegian networks is
currently 34%. The maximum is 168% and the minimum is 0.1%.
Q = [C (e – e ) + In (e –1)] (5)1 2 1 2
As seen from (5), the revenue effect of investments consists of two parts. Clearly, we always have
. However, the outcome of the component of (5) is not certain as it is not clear(e –1)≤0 (e – e )2 2 1
whether, following an investment, the cost efficiency increases, decreases, or remains constant.5
Depending on the initial and after investment measured cost efficiency, can take differentQ
values. If , the firm gains less from investing compared to the case of no cost benchmarkingQ0
(ceteris paribus). However, when investment costs are fully recovered as there is no bench-Q = 0
marking. If , investment creates synergy by excessive increase in efficiency although this mayQ0
not happen under normal condition6 so in most situations one expects .Q≤0
DRE = DC + kQ (6)
Thus, as shown in (6), the change in revenue after investments is not necessarily equal to the change
in cost and it crucially depends on the value that takes. Although the revenue also depends onQ
the power of incentive ( ), it is a predetermined parameter which is beyond the control of the firm.k
A desirable outcome can be achieved when and benchmarking has no adverse impact on theQ = 0
firms’ revenue.—i.e. when the efficiency after investments increases (due to productivity of capital)
to an amount that results in (note that also when the firm is on the efficient frontier andQ = 0
remains there after investments, we have and consequently becomes zero). Thise = e = 1, Q2 1
efficiency can be obtained by solving (5) with respect to as in (7).e2
C e + In1 1
e = e = (7)no-impact 2 C + In1
Equation (7) shows how the Norwegian incentive regulation links investments to efficiency im-
provement. In order for a firm to earn a profit on its investments as if there was no cost benchmarking
(ceteris paribus), its efficiency should be, at least, after the investment. An efficiencyC e + In1 1
C + In1
level below this will result in lower revenue relative to the no benchmarking case. We use the term
‘no impact efficiency’ to refer to the revenue-neutral efficiency effect of investment under cost
benchmarking as presented in (7). In other words, a firm is considered ‘investment efficient’ when
it meets the ‘no impact efficiency’ criteria under regulation.7
The Norwegian incentive regulation links investment and efficiency to ensure that firms
do not undertake undue investments. This means that the regulator does not need to interfere in the
firms’ investment decisions, but indirectly incentivises them to be investment efficient. A limit
analysis of (7) shows that as increases, the efficiency will approach . The opposite of thisC e e1 2 1
implies that when the ratio of investment to other costs8 increases, the firm needs to achieve a
higher efficiency level (which in limits is equal to unity) in order to avoid revenue loss. This means
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Figure 2: Possible Efficiency Effects of Investment under Norwegian Incentive Regulation
that the expected interval of the no impact efficiency change is , which dependinge ≤ e ≤11 no impact
upon the investment to cost ratio would be closer to lower or upper boundary.
Figure 2 shows the possible outcomes of efficiency effect of investment under Norwegian
regulation as an ex-post regulatory model for treatment of investments. When a firm (with an initial
cost and efficiency level) undertakes an investment, it achieves a new level of efficiency (A). On
the other hand, regulation links the initial cost, efficiency, and investment to no impact efficiency
and rewards or penalises the firm based on the efficiency effect of their investments (B). In practice,
this reflects the incentive mechanism pertaining to investments.
3.2 Modelling a Stochastic Efficient Frontier
This section presents the efficiency measurement techniques and empirical model estimated
in this study. We estimate the efficiency of firms before and after investments and use the efficiencies
to calculate the ‘no impact efficiency’ for current investment levels of the networks. We use an
input distance function which allows us to estimate the efficiency of the firms when input price
data is not available (Fa¨re and Lovell, 1978; Coelli and Perelman 1996). Other advantages of
distance functions are that they do not depend on explicit behavioural assumptions such as cost
minimization or profit maximization and they can accommodate multiple inputs and outputs (Kum-
bhakar and Lovell 2000; Coelli et al., 2005).
Input distance functions have been used in empirical studies for efficiency and productivity
analysis of industrial units as in Abrate and Erbetta (2010) and Das and Kumbhakar (2012) as well
as those of electricity networks such as Tovar et al. (2011), Hess and Cullmann (2007), and Grow-
itsch et al. (2012). The output of electricity networks is determined exogenously by demand for
energy and connections. Thus companies can only adjust their inputs (i.e. costs) to deliver a given
service efficiently.
An input distance function can be defined as in (8):
xID (x,y) = max w: ∈L(y) (8)   w
where represents the input vectors that produce the output vector , and indicates aL(y) x y w
proportional reduction in input vector. The function has the following characteristics: (i) it is linearly
homogenous in , (ii) it is non-decreasing in and non-increasing in , (iii) it is concave in andx x y x
quasi-concave in , and (iv) if then and if is on the frontier of input set.I Iy x∈L(y) D ≥1 D = 1 x
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9. Some studies use the Bayesian approach to impose regularity conditions (Greene, 2008).
Input-oriented technical efficiency is defined as the inverse of the distance function and
can be obtained from (9).
ITE = 1/D (x,y), 0TE≤1 (9)
When a firm is operating on the frontier it has a distance function value equal to unity and conse-
quently has a technical efficiency score of 1. We use a flexible functional form for input distance
function as in (10):
M M M1IlnD = α + α lny + α lny lny (10)∑ ∑ ∑it 0 m mit mn mit nit2m = 1 m = 1 n = 1
K K K1
+ β lnx + β lnx lnx∑ ∑ ∑k kit kl kit lit2k = 1 k = 1 l = 1
K M 1 2+ d lnx lny + h t + h t + v∑ ∑ km kit mit 1 11 it2k = 1 m = 1
where represents the distance function, is output, is input, represents time trend,ID y x tit mit kit
subscript i = 1 . . .N denotes the number of the firms, and t = 1 . . .T indicates number of years. Also,
and show the number of outputs and inputs respectively. Parameters , ,m = 1 . . . M k = 1 . . . K α β
and are to be estimated.d, h
The flexible functional form relaxes the restrictions on demand elasticities and elasticities
of substitution nevertheless; imposing appropriate curvature on translog models can be challenging
(Greene, 2008).9 The time trend is included in order to capture technical change and also everything
else that we cannot measure but varies over time and has a common effect on all firms (e.g., price
of capitals, change in the regulatory environment, etc.).
The condition of homogeneity of degree one in inputs is imposed by the use of the
following constraints: and where and where
K K K
β = 1 β = 0 k = 1,2, . . . ,K d = 0 m =∑ ∑ ∑k kl km
k = 1 l = 1 l = 1
.1,2, . . . ,M
The symmetry condition is met if:
α = α m,n = 1,2, . . . M, andmn nm (11)
β = β k,l = 1,2, . . . ,Kkl lk,
We transform the input distance function into econometric models to be estimated by the stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA) method and to obtain technical efficiency of the firms. Imposing the ho-
mogeneity of degree one by deflating inputs by Kth input (we use other cost ( ) to deflate)K–1 C1
will lead to (12):
IlnD – lnx = f [(lnx – lnx ),lny ,t] + v (12)it Kit kit Kit mit it
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where is the translog functional form. For the purpose of estimation we rearrange the abovef (.)
equation as:
– lnx = f [(lnx – lnx ),lny ,t] + v – u (13)Kit kit Kit mit it it
where represents the non-negative technical inefficiency. The error components have theIlnD = uit it
following distributions.
2v  iid N(0,σ ) and (14)it v
+ 2u  iid N (0,σ )it u
where vit is a normally distributed random error term and is a half-normal heteroscedastic randomuit
error term that captures inefficiency. As the efficiency is affected by the investments we model the
heteroscedastic inefficiency variance ( as in (15).2hetσ )u
2 2hetLogσ = q + q Log(In) + q Log (In) (15)u 0 1 2
2 2hetσ = exp(q + q Log(In) + q Log (In))u 0 1 2
where , and are parameters that need to be estimated and “ ” is normalised investmentq q q In0 1 2
level with respect to sample mean. As shown in (16) we can separate the heteroscedastic variance
into its homoscedastic component ( ) and the element related to investments.2homσu
2 2hetσ = exp(q )exp(q Log(In) + q Log (In)) = (16)u 0 1 2
2 2homσ  exp(q Log(In) + q Log (In))u 1 2
This allows us to purge the effect of investments on inefficiency as seen from (17). In terms of
estimation, equations (13) and (15) are estimated simultaneously based on the only observed data
in (13). Having estimated them, the homoscedastic inefficiency can be obtained as follows:
+ 2 2homu N (0,σ  exp(q Log(In) + q Log (In)))it u 1 2
+ 2 2homu N (0,σ ) exp(q Log(In) + q Log (In)) (17)it u 1 2
2uˆ = exp(qˆ Log(In) + qˆ Log (In)) uˆit 1 2 before
It is clear that where , On the other hand, thus we can write:uˆ = E[u  ]  = v – u uˆ = uˆ⎪it it it it it it it after
uˆafter
uˆ = (18)before 2exp(qˆ Log(In) + qˆ Log (In))1 2
where, is before-investment inefficiency and is after-investment inefficiency ( ). Theuˆ uˆ uˆbefore after it
firm specific technical efficiency is then computed by and . Thee = exp(– uˆ ) e = exp(– uˆ )1 before 2 after
“no impact efficiency” is calculated using Equation (7).
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10. Consumer willingness to pay for quality of service is derived from consumer surveys and technical analysis.
11. We examined the case of using “distributed energy” as an output along with number of customers. However, due
to the presence of sever multicollinearity between these two variables, the estimated function does not satisfy regularity
conditions (i.e. monotonicity and concavity). This is also the case when we estimated with three standard outputs.
12. The three environmental variables are: (1) snow conditions, in millimeters of snow per year at a given temperature
(around 0 degrees C), (2) Wind and distance to coast, as a ratio (average extreme wind/distance to coast), and (3) forest
productivity, a number between 0 and 1 showing the share of forest with this growth rate along the power lines.
3.3 Data
We use a dataset comprising a weakly balanced panel of 129 distribution network utilities
from 2004 to 2010. All monetary data are in real terms and adjusted to 2010 price level. The data
is collected by the Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Directorate (NVE) and used in order to
set the networks’ allowed revenues. The data collection procedure is mainly through an electronic
system named eRapp (NVE, 2007). These include both technical and economic data. The economic
data gives detailed information on the costs and revenues with respect to different network activities.
The technical data, on the other hand, include consumer specific information such as customer
numbers at each category, energy distributed, network energy losses, and also technical information
about the networks such as length, type and capacity of lines and cables, transformers, switches,
number of meters and finally duration and frequency of interruptions (NVE, 2007).
The network companies are responsible for the accuracy of metering data within their grid
area even for metering and collections that are outsourced to a third party. The only data that is not
based on the firm’s own report is the environmental data (see Footnote 12). Following the data
collection, the economic data are verified by independent auditors and controlled by the regulator.
Moreover, NVE controls the technical data by visiting the site and also auditing the technical
components of distribution networks and other comparable sources (NVE, 2007).
Our distance function model consists of two inputs and two outputs. The inputs are capital
expenditure ( ) and other costs ( ). Following the Norwegian regulatory approach, we incorporateIn C1
quality of service into our benchmarking model by adding the cost of negative externalities (network
energy losses and service interruptions) to the directly incurred elements of operating cost as pre-
sented in (19).
C = Operational Expenditure + Cost of Losses + Cost of Energy Not Supplied (19)1
The cost of energy not supplied is calculated from the number of minutes of interruptions multiplied
by consumer willingness-to-pay for a more reliable service.10 The cost of network energy losses is
computed by multiplying the physical losses with average annual system price of electricity.
The standard outputs, in efficiency measurement of distribution companies, are the number
of customers, energy distributed and network length (or the size of service area) (Coelli et al., 2012).
We use “total number of customers” (residential plus recreational homes) and “network length as
outputs.11 These two variables are commonly used in efficiency analysis of electricity networks
(e.g., Growitsch et al., 2012; Migue´is et al., 2011; Coelli et al., 2012). In addition to the input and
output variables we use three weather and geographical variables in order to capture the hetero-
geneity among firms.12 These factors can impact cost efficiency of the networks and controlling for
252 / The Energy Journal
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Name Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
Inputs
Other costs* C1 1205.25 1178987 41260.63 67709.02
Capital expenditures* In 6.82083 121042.4 13113.12 17518.02
Outputs
Network length (Km) NL 14 8111 558.27 779.13
Number of customers (#) CU 18 515152 13054 26964
Geographical variables
Snow condition (millimetres) snow 0 1193.61 372.64 196.54
Wind/distance to cost (ratio) wind 0 0.1610 0.0164 0.0289
Forest productivity (fraction) forest 0 0.5489 0.1566 0.1197
*Monetary variables are in ‘000 NOK.
13. We examined the influence of asset age (ratio of depreciation to book value) as a control variable. However, the
variable showed inconsistencies in the sign of the age variable itself as well as for first order terms of other variables. Other
measures of age may produce different results but these were not available. At the same time, the results indicated that
inclusion of age does not change the efficiency scores significantly.
their effects can help to account for the heterogeneity in the operating environment of network
companies (Jamasb et al., 2012).13 Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics of the data used.
As we use “other costs” ( ) to impose homogeneity of degree one, the dependent variableC1
of model is . The parameters used in the model are obtained by maximum likelihood– Log(C )1
estimation procedure. The optimisation technique used is Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (bhhh) algo-
rithm. Furthermore, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the first order terms, all variables are
divided by their sample mean prior to estimation.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The profit motive implies that incentive regulated firms evaluate the costs and benefits of
undertaking investments by comparing the possible reductions and increases in their allowed rev-
enue as a result of efficiency effect of their investments in cost benchmarking. However, the outcome
depends on the net efficiency effect achieved by the investments.
Table 2 presents the results of the input distance function and heteroscedastic variance
model estimations. As shown in the table, the coefficients of first order terms for the number of
customers, network length and investments are statistically significant and have the expected signs.
These coefficients can be interpreted as distance function elasticity with respect to outputs and
inputs at sample mean. The first order coefficients for snow, wind and forest are significant and
consistent in terms of sign indicating that these geographic variables are also cost drivers. Addi-
tionally, all interactions of the forest variable with outputs are significant. However, only one in-
teraction term of wind and snow variables with outputs is statistically significant. The heterosce-
dastic inefficiency variance model shows significant coefficients both for the first order and quadratic
terms.
The translog functional forms do not satisfy monotonicity and convexity globally (regu-
larity conditions) hence, these need to be verified a posteriori (Sauer et al., 2006). Monotonicity
implies two conditions for partial derivatives of input distance functions: non-decreasing in inputs
and non-increasing in outputs (Perelman and Santin, 2005). Appropriate curvature implies concavity
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Table 2: Input Distance Function Model Estimation
Dependent variable: – Log(C )1
Variables Coefficient Std. Err
Constant –5.799*** (0.911)
Log(CU) 0.428* (0.233)
Log(NL) 0.625*** (0.218)
Log(In) –0.924*** (0.170)
20.5Log (CU) 0.235*** (0.025)
20.5Log (NL) 0.134*** (0.049)
20.5Log (In) –0.073*** (0.016)
Log(CU)∗Log(NL) –0.159*** (0.036)
Log(CU)∗Log(In) –0.007 (0.020)
Log(NL)∗Log(In) 0.026 (0.020)
t –0.010 (0.010)
20.5t 0.011*** (0.003)
snow 0.075*** (0.021)
wind 0.022*** (0.005)
forest 0.064*** (0.013)
snow∗Log(CU) –0.003 (0.029)
snow∗Log(NL) 0.073** (0.035)
wind∗Log(CU) –0.019** (0.008)
wind∗Log(NL) 0.014 (0.009)
forest∗Log(CU) 0.077*** (0.023)
forest∗Log(NL) –0.067*** (0.024)
2Log(σ )u
Log(In) –1.801*** (0.684)
2Log (In) –0.261** (0.124)
Constant –5.605*** (1.005)
Note: * p0.10; ** p0.05; *** p0.01
For ease of interpretation, the model coefficients were multiplied by –1.
14. Appropriate curvature cannot be guaranteed at all data points due to the presence of trade-off between flexibility
and theoretical consistency. It is, however, desirable to have these conditions at least at the vicinity of the approximation
point (e.g., sample mean), or for a range of dataset in which case interpretation capabilities with respect to the data points
far from point of approximation is restricted. For a detail discussion of the regularity conditions see Sauer et al. (2006).
in inputs and quasi-concavity in outputs which boils down to a negative definite Hessian matrix on
inputs and a negative semi-definite bordered Hessian matrix on outputs (Perelman and Santin, 2005).
The results of a posteriori check on monotonicity and concavity conditions are presented in Tables
A1 and A2 respectively.
The results show that monotonicity is satisfied at sample mean for all inputs and outputs.
Moreover, for the inputs “investment” and “other costs” and output “network length” monotonicity
is satisfied 100% over all data points. The figure is 99.6% for the other output “number of cus-
tomers”. The Hessian matrix of inputs is negative definite at sample mean without violation of
appropriate curvature over data points. The bordered Hessian matrix of outputs is, however, indef-
inite at the point of approximation and satisfies appropriate curvature only 18.7% of times over
data points.14
Figure 3 illustrates the changes in the efficiencies before and after investments. As shown
in the figure, investments have impacted the efficiency of the networks and within a relatively wide
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Figure 3: Efficiency Change Following Investments
Figure 4: The Distribution of Efficiency Change Following Investments
range. It is evident that the impact of investments on the efficiency variation among the firms is
not uniform, in the sense that some of the firms have gained while some others lost efficiency. This
complies with the basic notion of ex-post regulatory treatment of investments based on bench-
marking that efficiency effects influence investment behaviour of firms as undue investments face
the risk of efficiency loss.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of efficiency variation following investments. The descrip-
tive statistics of graph data is presented in Table 3. As seen from the graph and the table, the change
in efficiency tends towards an asymmetrical distribution. The Jarque-Bera test of normality is re-
jected and distribution is right skewed. The maximum positive variation is 0.49 whereas on the
negative side it is –0.34. Also, the majority of observations lie between –0.15 and 0.08 efficiency
variations following investments (one standard deviation with respect to mean).
Furthermore, as illustrated by the scatter plot in Figure 5, efficiency loss after investments
is more prevalent among the companies with lower investment to total cost ratios. On the other
hand, companies with average investment levels show more efficiency gain following their invest-
ments compared with companies with very high share of investment in total cost. This suggests
that middle scale investments have generally been more productive than the larger and especially
than the small ones.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
of e2 –e1
Mean –0.035
Median –0.043
Maximum 0.496
Minimum –0.345
Std. Dev. 0.112
Skewness 1.022
Kurtosis 5.711
Jarque-Bera 408.59
Probability 0.000
Figure 5: Efficiency Change Versus Investments to Total Cost Ratio
Figure 6: Efficiency Variation Versus Network Size (length)
One striking point is that the efficiency loss following investment is mainly related to the
smaller companies. As seen from Figure 6, many of the utilities with a network length of less than
1000 km have lost efficiency following their investments. These companies have also lower in-
vestment to total cost ratios. On the contrary, the efficiency gain from investments increases with
the size of firm, in the sense that highest efficiency gains are achieved by firms with a network
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15. In the extreme, one network served 18 customers in a year and one with 14 Km of network length only (see Table
1). As seen from Figure 6, the majority of the companies have a network length of less than 1000 Km.
length in excess of 1000 km. However, for very large firms, the efficiency gains from investments
tend to decline again.
These observations suggest that smaller companies tend to be less productive and less able
to absorb the full benefits of their capital expenditures. One reason can be that small companies are
not operating at optimum size.15 Moreover, the fact that lower investment to total cost ratio in these
companies did not lead to an efficiency improvement indicates the complexity of the investment
and efficiency relationship under benchmarking as lower investment levels might lead to an increase
in other costs and may not help with efficiency improvement. This also implies that small scale
investments may need better scrutiny prior to implementation in order to avoid lower allowed
revenues as a result of cost benchmarking.
Figure 7 summarises the distribution of before investment, after investment and no impact
efficiencies estimated in different years. As seen from the figure, in all cases, the distributions do
not show zero skewness rather the mass of distribution is concentrated around the more efficient
region without a noticeable change over different years. Additionally, the lower quartile is higher
for the case of no impact efficiency compared with before investments and after investments effi-
ciency, suggesting that given the current levels of investment efficiency improvement is required
for many firms.
Table 4 compares the average of the same efficiencies in each year for all companies. As
the table shows, the average efficiency declined following investments and it falls behind no impact
efficiency in all years. This deviation varies from 3.7% to 6.2% in different years. Moreover, there
is no stable pattern of change, in average efficiencies, over different years. However, the average
becomes affected with outliers hence; in order to make a more reliable inference on the performance
of sector we have weighted the efficiencies by the share of their corresponding investment in the
total investment of the sector. This is to ensure that the weight effect of firms on total investment
in the sector is taken into account when looking at the sector level. This is particularly relevant to
the case of the Norwegian distribution companies which are diverse in terms of network size and
customer density.
As shown in Table 4, the average efficiency gain following investments increased to around
10% when weighted. Additionally, there is a decline in weighted no impact efficiency. Also, the
weighted average efficiency following investment exceeds the no impact efficiency by around 6.4%.
This clearly indicates that equal treatment of firms to infer about their investment behaviour “at
sector level” can result in biased conclusions. Moreover, the fact that the weighted average no
impact efficiency declined below the weighted average after investment efficiency signals that the
sector can still increase the level of investments, through new reallocation of investments, and
without lowering the average efficiency gain of the sector.
The reallocation of investments can increase the total investments in the sector because
there are significant performance differences among the companies as depicted in Figures 3 and 4.
The very efficient utilities that exceeded the no impact efficiency may wish to increase their in-
vestment in order to gain from their efficiency level. The investment increase can be continued
until efficiency after investment declines to no impact efficiency, in which state, a form of optimality
is achieved. On the other hand, those firms that their efficiency after investments falls short of no
impact efficiency need to reduce their investment level in order to avoid inefficiency associated
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Figure 7: Distribution of Efficiencies Estimated
Table 4: Average “Before Investment,” “After Investment,” and
“No Impact” Efficiency
Efficiency measured 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average of e1 0.951 0.953 0.948 0.949 0.947 0.946 0.943
Average of e2 0.912 0.908 0.898 0.911 0.925 0.922 0.913
Average of eno-impact 0.962 0.965 0.960 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.959
Weighted average e = 0.8611 e = 0.9632 e = 0.899no-impact
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16. In this analysis we ignore the concept of dynamic efficiency hence; we do not take into account the cost effect of
investments that takes more than one regulatory period to become realised. This is because our positive analysis is based
on the current form of incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investments as practiced in Norway and
some other countries.
revenue loss.16 The total capital expenditure of the companies that fall short of no impact efficiency
accounts for 34% of the sector investment whereas this figure is about 66% for networks that
obtained or exceeded no impact efficiency. Therefore, the net effect of the new reallocation is an
increase in total investments without reducing the average efficiency of the sector.
As discussed above, the outcome of ex-post regulatory treatment of investments through
total cost benchmarking is that some firms will lose part of their capital cost while some others
recover all their investment and some make above normal profits. For example, the firms that appear
to have outperformed the investment efficiency requirement—i.e. their efficiency after investments
exceeded the no impact efficiency considerably (the instance of discussed in Section 3.1) canQ0
earn more compared to the no benchmarking case. Under the circumstance that an “investment
efficient firm” gains and an “investment inefficient firm” loses, the ex-post regulatory treatment of
investment is effective in rewarding efficient and penalising inefficient firms.
However, this might not always be the case as the condition under which benchmarking
produces reliable results does not always hold. This is because efficiency, in benchmarking terms,
is a relative concept and only reveals information about firm performance in relation to other firms.
Thus, the relative efficiency of a firm can also improve when the peer companies are not performing
well. For instance, when companies are capital productive and their investments are used and useful,
they might move to a higher level of relative efficiency after investments. However, the same can
happen when they underinvest, something which gives them the appearance of cost efficiency.
Therefore, unless the frontier firms genuinely represent the best practice, the results of benchmark-
ing can be misleading.
The benchmarking limitation regarding investment embraces other cases such as when the
firms’ investments behaviour is harmonised in the sense that they are in the same phases of their
investment cycles. This refers to the case that firms invest in similar periods and in proportion to
their total cost levels but beyond their actual need. As the measure of efficiency is relative the firms
tend to remain in a relatively similar efficiency position before and after investment. Under this
condition, benchmarking can fail to identify the incidence of overinvestment.
The regulator expects that the threat of partial disallowance of capital expenditures built
into the regulatory formula leads the firms towards efficient investments. However; the power of
the model to detect overinvestments is limited to the case of ‘out of phase’ investments (i.e. when
firms are not in the same investment cycle). Thus, sector-wide ‘in phase’ or cyclically harmonised
overinvestments by the firms are not revealed in the process of benchmarking because the approach
is based on between-firms comparisons. This will, in turn, limit the ability of the regulator to
effectively address the issue of overinvestment. Harmonised investment behaviour can happen when
many firms follow a similar investment policy. For instance, when a regulator guides the investment
into a desired direction by, for example, offering a higher return for investments in innovation and
particular types of technologies and activities (e.g., Smart Grids).
A parallel argument also holds in the case of harmonised underinvestment. This problem
arises when the incentives to invest are not strong enough or the regulation is restrictive which
causes firms to reduce their investments. In the short run, this can give the appearance of cost
efficiency while, overtime, leading to gradual degradation of the networks and their reliability.
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17. This strategy can have significant side effects such as inducing uncertainty in regulation. Therefore, it needs to be
used with strong evidence of persistent or systematic over or underinvestment in the sector.
18. Capital expenditures and operational expenditures.
19. This figure is perceived to be lower for electricity and gas distribution companies (Ofgem, 2010).
There are some possible remedies to address the cases of harmonised underinvestment or
overinvestment. For instance, the regulator can use the power of incentive ( ) in order to influencek
the investment inefficient firms when there is evidence of overcapitalisation. The higher the power
of incentive is the greater possibility of financial loss as a result of investment inefficiency. Thus,
a high causes investment inefficient firms to reduce their investments and consequently improvek
their efficiency. Also, frontier firms need to follow the same path to maintain their position on the
frontier. At present, is set at 60% for Norwegian distribution companies. A small increase ink k
can reduce the net efficiency gains by the firms and create disincentive for investments. On the
contrary, a reduction of the power of incentive aligns the revenue of the firm more with its actual
cost and increases its propensity to invest. However, the power of incentive is usually set for a long
period of time in order to make the investment behaviour of firms predictable and provide a stable
regulatory environment. Therefore, the ability of the regulator to modify the power of incentive
can be constrained.17
In order to avoid underinvestment and deterioration of quality of supply induced by cost
reduction incentives incorporated in incentive regulation, regulators adopt either quality perfor-
mance targets or include the cost of network energy losses and cost of energy not supplied in
benchmarking model as in the case of Norway. This is to prevent systematic underinvestment which
can endanger network reliability over time. However, the issue is that underinvestment can have
an immediate effect on efficiency improvement of the network whereas its impact on network
reliability will be realised in the longer run.
Another possible problem of ex-post regulatory treatment of investment using bench-
marking is that it can ease the strategic behaviour for trade-off between Capex and Opex18 in order
to avoid revenue loss from investment inefficiency when firms invest beyond their productive
capacity. For instance, as shown in Table 2, investments and other costs are negatively correlated
in such a way that a 1% increase in investment with respect to the mean of the sector can result in
0.92% reduction of other costs. This in turn raises the regulatory issue of substitution of capital for
labour introduced by Averch-Johnson (1962).
The regulatory treatment of investments involves a risk sharing dimension between the
utilities and the consumers irrespective of being ex-ante or ex-post. The ex-post regulatory treatment
of investment has the merit of being less interventionist. However, this comes at the cost of trans-
ferring investment risks to the companies. On the contrary, the ex-ante regulatory model is more
interventionist but less risky for the investments of the network companies because risks are mainly
transferred to the users of networks.
Thus, it is less likely that firms operating under a pure ex-ante regulatory regime (i.e., no
ex-post evaluation of used and useful capital) peruse cost reducing investments as the investment
cost is decoupled from their efficiency level. For example, in the UK, under the current regulatory
framework for electricity and gas transmission networks, which are a form of ex-ante model (though
subject to ex-post efficiency assessment), consumers are exposed to 75% of the companies “actual
cost” (Ofgem, 2010).19 Under the ex-post model it is more likely that consumers are exposed to
the “efficient cost” of firms however, the implementation of this model has proven to be more
complicated that initially perceived.
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To sum up, the relationship between investment and efficiency under incentive regulation
with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment is not straightforward. As efficiency is a relative
concept in economics, performance of a firm is not only related to its own behaviour but also to
that of other firms. The conditions under which overinvestment can reduce cost efficiency might
not always hold. Moreover, it takes time for underinvestment to appear as cost in the form of quality
of service deterioration. The Norwegian regulator attempts to incentivise the companies to operate
and maintain their networks in an efficient manner and provide a high level of reliability. However,
the use of total cost benchmarking does not necessarily lead to the socio-economic efficient level
of investments. The implication of these for regulatory framework of network companies is that,
there is no ideal measure to address the issue of investment under regulation given the trade-off
between the level of intervention and risks of capital cost to the utilities or their consumers. There-
fore, the regulator might choose to combine the effective elements of different approaches to balance
between the benefits and shortcomings of taking up a particular method. Some previous works
which have proposed such new approaches, in the context of transmission grid, include combining
the merchant model with benchmark or price regulation models (see Hogan et al., 2010) or the
design of network tariffs such as two-part tariffs as in Vogelsang (2001).
5. CONCLUSIONS
Contrary to the early years of electricity sector reforms when regulators were mainly
concerned with cost efficiency, an emerging and pressing issue is how to ensure sufficient and
efficient level of investments in the regulated networks. Over the years, efficiency of the natural
monopoly power networks has been improving as a result of incentive regulation. However, the
need for significant investments in the coming years combined with the incentives to reduce costs
gives rise to new challenges regarding the efficiency and sufficiency of investments in the networks.
In this study we analysed the relation between cost efficiency and investments in electricity distri-
bution networks under ex-post regulatory treatment of capital expenditures using the case of Nor-
way.
We introduced the concept of “no impact efficiency” as a revenue-neutral efficiency effect
of investments under cost benchmarking which, if achieved, makes the firm “investment efficient”
and immune from cost disallowance in the benchmarking process. Also, we estimated the observed
efficiency effect of investments in order to compare this with the no impact efficiency and discussed
the implication of cost benchmarking for the investment behaviour of distribution companies in
Norway.
The results show that the weighted average efficiency gain of the networks from invest-
ments is 10% reflecting the fact that more investment often resulted in higher efficiency. The results
suggest that networks that fall short of the no impact efficiency need to reduce their capital expen-
diture in order to improve their efficiency following investment. On the other hand, firms that
outperform the no impact efficiency may wish to increase their investment levels in order to gain
from the efficiency they achieved. Overall, the new reallocation of investments increases the total
investment of the sector as a whole but without lowering the average efficiency gain of the sector.
At the same time, there are significant variations in efficiency gain following investments
at the level of individual companies. Firms with average investment to total cost ratio have gained
more efficiency through their investments relative to those with higher or lower than average.
Moreover, the efficiency loss following investments is mainly related to the smaller networks. An
implication of this for regulatory framework can be that cost reducing incentives have adversely
affected the smaller firms leading to lower level of investments and higher operating costs and
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consequently efficiency loss in these firms. Given that average investment levels have been more
productive indicates that the incentives should prevent the network utilities from going below or
beyond certain levels of capital expenditures.
The relationship between investment and efficiency under incentive regulation is not
straight forward. The effectiveness of ex-post regulatory treatment of investments relies on the
reliability of benchmarking results which are potentially vulnerable to certain trends and behaviours
such as harmonised over- and under-investments. Despite these issues, under the ex-post regulatory
treatment of investments, consumers are more likely to be exposed to efficient level of costs com-
pared with the ex-ante model. At the same time, the networks bear a higher investment risk under
the ex-post model. Thus, the regulatory treatment of investment always involves an element of risk
sharing trade-off between the firms and their consumers.
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Regularity Conditions (monotonicity)
Variable Derivative Value (at sample mean)
Percentage violated
over data points
Outputs
I I I∂D ∂lnD D
bh = =m ∂y ∂lny ym m m
M K ID
= α + α lny + d lnx ≤0∑ ∑m mn n km k yn = 1 k = 1 m
CU
NL
–0.428
–0.6257
0.0035
0.00
Inputs
I I I∂D ∂lnD D
h = =k ∂x ∂lnx xk k k
K M ID
= β + β lnx + d lny ≥0∑ ∑k kl l km m  xl = 1 m = 1 k
In
C
+ 0.924
+ 1.00
0.00
0.00
Table A2: Regularity Conditions (concavity)
Curvature and corresponding matrix
Value at sample mean
(K = M = 2)
Percentage with
correct curvature over
data points
Quasi-concave(Outputs)
0 bh . . . . bh1 M
bh bh . . . . bh1 11 1MBH =     
bh bh . . . . bhM 1M MM
0 –0.530 –0.711
–0.530 0.271 0.175 
–0.711 0.175 0.564
Definiteness at sample mean: Indefinite
18.7%
Concave(Inputs)
h h . . . . h11 12 1K
h h . . . . h21 22 2KH =     
h h . . . . hK1 K2 KK
–0.936 0 0 –1.101
Definiteness at sample mean: Negative
definite
100%

